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Frege’s Choice: The Indefinability Argument, Truth,
and the Fregean Conception of Judgment
Junyeol Kim
I develop a new reading of Frege’s argument for the indefin-
ability of truth. I concentrate on what Frege literally says in the
passage that contains the argument. This literal reading of the
passage establishes that the indefinability argument is an ar-
guably sound argument to the following conclusion: provided
that the Fregean conception of judgment—which has recently
been countered by Hanks—is correct and that truth is a prop-
erty of truth-bearers, a vicious infinite regress is produced. Given
this vicious regress, Frege chooses to reject that truth is a prop-
erty of truth-bearers. Frege’s choice leads to a unique version
of the Fregean conception of judgment. His unique conception
of judgment can cope with Hanks’s recent criticisms against the
Fregean conception.
Frege’s Choice: The Indefinability
Argument, Truth, and the Fregean
Conception of Judgment
Junyeol Kim
1. The Indefinability Argument and Frege’s
Conception of Judgment
This paper is about Frege’s famous argument for the indefinabil-
ity of truth he presents in ‘Logic’ (1897) and ‘Thought’ (1919a).
It has been heavily discussed, and thus one might wonder what
merits revisiting this argument can possibly have.1 I sharpen the
aim of this paper by responding to this skepticism.
The indefinability argument is cryptic. First, it is difficult to
find out what the rationales are for the literal assertions Frege
makes in the passages that contain the argument. Thus, sec-
ondly, it is also difficult to figure out what exactly its premises
are. Facing these exegetical difficulties, an interpreter can choose
either of the following two methods. One is to read Frege’s points
made in his other works into the passages that present the inde-
finability argument and reconstruct the argument through this
projection.2 The other way is to retrieve the premises of the ar-
gument by a line-by-line literal analysis of those passages and
1For instance by Asay (2013); Carruthers (1982); Heck (2012); Kemp (1995);
Kremer (2000); Künne (2003, 2008); Levin (1996); Pagin (2001); Ricketts (1996);
Soames (1999); Stanley (1996), etc.
2For instance, a number of commentators (e.g., Carruthers 1982; Künne
2008; Soames 1999) take it to be one of the premises of the argument that the
thought that ? is identical with the thought that the thought that ? is true.
However, nowhere in Frege’s presentation of the argument, the identity thesis
is mentioned. In fact, the identity thesis is mentioned later in ‘Thought’ as if it
is an idea that has not been introduced in the earlier part of the paper. There
are other readings of the argument that fall under this category. For instance,
then examine if what we have retrieved make sense or whether
they are well connected to Frege’s other points. Both methods
are legitimate strategies for interpretative works that have their
own strengths and weaknesses. In the case of the indefinability
argument, nevertheless, there are few works that adopt the sec-
ond strategy. What I would like to do in this paper is to develop
an interpretation of the argument that adopts the second strat-
egy.3 In other words, I develop a literal analysis of the passages
and then connect what is retrieved to Frege’s other works.
We can determine the structure of the indefinability argument
fairly uniquely by a line-by-line interpretation of the passage
from ‘Thought’. The literal analysis reveals that the argument
presupposes the Fregean conception of judgment—a conception
criticized by Hanks (2007, 2011, 2015, 2018).4 Also, although the
final conclusion of Frege’s argument is that truth is indefinable,
its premises lead to the secondary conclusion that truth cannot
be a property.5 In fact, he tries to establish that truth is not a
property in his other works:
. . . truth (Wahrheit) is not a property of sentences or thoughts, as
language might lead one to suppose. . . a thought is related to its
truth-value as the sense of a sign is to its reference (Frege 1914,
234).6
Greimann (2007) reads the argument based on the notion of logical relations he
formulates out of Frege’s other works. Levin (1996) interprets the argument
by appealing to Frege’s Begriffsschrift.
3My interpretation turns out to be quite close to Heck (2012) and Ricketts
(1996).
4Hanks puts forward a non-Fregean conception of proposition based on
a non-Fregean understanding of judgment. He claims that the Fregean con-
ception of judgment posits the existence of propositions as abstract entities
that have truth-conditions independently of any human acticity. According
to Hanks, that is a fundamental mistake. I return to Hanks’s conception of
judgment and his criticism of the Fregean conception of judgment later.
5Ricketts (1996) understands the argument in the same way.
6For the translation of Frege’s works cited here, I depend on Frege (1970,
1979, 1997, 2013).
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Developing this interpretation of the indefinability argument
constitutes Section 2.
If my suggested reading is correct, then Frege is urging us
to retain the Fregean conception of judgment and abandon the
common belief that truth is a property of truth-bearers. Because
judging is acknowledging truth according to the Fregean concep-
tion, Frege ought to develop a version of the conception where
truth is not a property. And that is exactly what Frege is doing
in ‘On Sense and Reference’ when he provides the metaphorical
elucidation of judging according to which judging is taking a step
from the level of sense to that of reference. Thus, the indefinabil-
ity argument plays a crucial role in the establishment of Frege’s
conception of judgment. Frege’s own conception of judgment in
which truth is not a property has theoretical merits: it avoids
Hanks’s criticisms of the general conception that takes judgment
to be acknowledgment of truth. The interpretation and discus-
sion of Frege’s conception of judgment will constitute Section 3.
2. The Indefinability Argument
The indefinability argument in ‘Thought’ starts with the corre-
spondence definition of truth:
. . . Could we not maintain that there is truth when there is corre-
spondence in a certain respect? But which respect? For in that case
what ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true? We
should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a reality,
say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we should be
confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could be-
gin again. So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence
breaks down (Frege 1919a, 325).
He generalizes this argument over other attempts to define truth:
And any other attempt to define truth also breaks down. For in a
definition certain characteristics would have to be specified. And
in application to any particular case the question would always
arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present. So
we should be going round in a circle. So it seems likely that the
content of the word ‘true’ is sui generis and indefinable (Frege 1919a,
325).
Therefore, attempts to define truth fail in principle. This is
Frege’s indefinability argument.
Under my suggested reading, the conclusion of the argument
is that there cannot be a truth definition of the following form:
(TD) G is true iff G is Δ.
The argument contained in the passage is the following reductio:
Assumption: There is a definition of truth of the form (TD).
(TPro) If there is a definition of truth of the form (TD), truth is a
property.
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one acknowledges the truth of 〈G is true〉. (‘〈?〉’ means ‘the
thought that ?’.)
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
∴ There is no definition of truth of the form (TD).
Section 2.1 develops this reading. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 develop
the rationales for (VIR) and (JPro) respectively. A few notes. First,
‘an absurd result’ in (VIR) refers to a vicious infinite regress. I ex-
plain this point when I develop a rationale for (VIR) in Section 2.2.
Secondly, one might wonder why the notion of property has to
be included in the interpretation of Frege’s argument because
the passage does not mention ‘property’. Here is a quick re-
ply: in the above presentation in ‘Thought’, what ‘characteristic’
means makes it clear that Frege is talking about such definitions
of truth. Moreover, in the presentation of the same argument in
‘Logic’ (1897) Frege makes it explict that this argument targets
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at attempts to define truth as a property. These points will be
explained further in Section 2.1. Lastly, the Fregean conception
of judgment is related to (JPro). According to the conception, we
perform judgment by way of grasping a thought and acknowl-
edging its truth. Judgment as such is a fundamental activity
through which other intellectual activities such as predicating a
property of an object is explained. As I explain in Section 2.3, the
truth of (JPro) hinges on that aspect of the Fregean conception of
judgment. It is because Frege retains his conception of judgment
that he takes truth to be indefinable.
2.1. The analysis of the passage from ‘Thought’
Two preliminaries. First, note that the argument is woven in
terms of the act of deciding whether something is true. Such an
act is equivalent to answering the question whether something
is true, which is in turn equivalent to making a judgment. In
‘Logic’ Frege writes:
A scientist who makes a scientific discovery usually begins by gasp-
ing just a thought, and then he asks himself whether it is to be
recognized as true; it is not until his investigation has turned out
in favor of the hypothesis, that he ventures to put it forward as
true. . . When we inwardly recognize that a thought is true, we are
making a judgment (Frege 1897, 138–39).
Thus, the indefinability argument concerns the act of judgment.7
This point helps us to understand the following question at the
beginning of the passage:
For in that case [i.e., if truth is defined as correspondence] what
ought we to do so as to decide whether something is true? (Frege
1919a, 325)
This presupposes that what it takes to decide whether something
is true partly depends on how truth is defined, i.e., what the
7For the relationship between the indefinability argument and judgment,
see Heck (2007, 2012), Kremer (2000), Pagin (2001), and Ricketts (1996).
nature of truth amounts to. It is misleading to ask what we
ought to do in order to do A in case that ?, if the truth of ‘?’ is
irrelevant to A so that what we must perform to do A does not
change regardless of whether it is the case that ?. For Frege, to
judge is to acknowledge the truth of a truth-bearer. Judging qua
acknowledging the truth of a truth-bearer hinges on the nature
of truth exactly in the way implied by the question: depending
on the nature of truth, what it takes to acknowledge the truth
of something must come to be different. Therefore, again, this
passage concerns judgment. This means that we can paraphrase
‘decide whether G is true’ in the argument into ‘acknowledge the
truth of G’.
The second point is concerned with truth-bearers in Frege.
Legitimate truth-bearers for Frege in his mature career are
thoughts, i.e., the senses of sentences, and to acknowledge the
truth of 〈?〉 is to judge that ?. Nevertheless, Frege initially talks
not about thoughts but about ideas in the argument, which
means that the argument must not depend on whether thoughts
alone are legitimate truth-bearers. As we will see, the argument
only requires it to be true that thoughts are a kind of truth-
bearers.
One might say that ‘deciding whether G is true’ ought to be
paraphrased into ‘acknowledging the truth or falsity of G’. As
we can see in ‘Negation’ (1919b), however, Frege denies that
there is the act of rejecting—acknowledging the falsity of a truth-
bearer—that is not reduced to the act of judging. For him, reject-
ing a truth-bearer G is judging that G is not true, i.e., acknowl-
edging the truth of 〈G is not true〉. Acknowledge the truth of 〈G
is not true〉 is just a particular case of acknowledging the truth of
a truth-bearer—where the truth-bearer whose truth is acknowl-
edged is a particular kind of thought. Therefore, we can cover the
act of rejecting by talking only about the act of acknowledging
the truth of a truth-bearer, i.e., the act of judging.
Now, I turn to retrieving (JPro) from the passage. First, we need
to look into Frege’s argument against the definition of truth as
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correspondence. Given that Frege is talking about judgment, the
question in the passage, ‘In that case what ought we to do so as
to decide whether something is true?’, is asking what must go
into the place of ‘)’ in the following:
(JCor) If truth consists in correspondence, one acknowledges the
truth of a truth-bearer G iff ).
Frege immediately answers:
We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a
reality, say, correspond in the specified respect (Frege 1919a, 325).
If we translate ‘inquire (i.e., decide) whether. . . is true’ into ‘ac-
knowledge the truth of. . . ’, the that-clause remains. To see what
it refers to, we need to take it into account that truth is defined
as correspondence to reality, which implies that truth is defined
as a property of truth-bearers. Hence, in ‘It is true that an idea
and a reality correspond in the specified respect’, ‘It is true’ must
denote the property truth. Then, the that-clause must refer to a
truth-bearer that has the property: a sort of propositional con-
tent Frege calls ‘thought’. Hence, Frege’s above statement can
be paraphrased as follows: ‘One should have to acknowledge
the truth of 〈G corresponds to reality〉’. That is, we have the
following:
(JCor*) If truth consists in correspondence, one acknowledges the
truth of a truth-bearer G iff one acknowledges the truth of
〈G corresponds to reality〉.
In the generalized indefinability argument, (JCor*) is general-
ized into (JPro). The key idea of this generalization consists in the
following:
For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified
(Frege 1919a, 325).
We need to note the term ‘characteristic (mark)’. In Grundgesetze
Frege says:
If one says: ‘a square is a rectangle in which adjacent sides are
equal’, one defines the concept square by stating what properties
something must have in order to fall under it. I call these properties
characteristic marks of the concept (Frege 1893, XIV).8
What I call ‘property’ corresponds to what Frege calls ‘concept’
here. A concept is a function whose value for a given argument
is always a truth-value, the True or the False. For instance, the
predicate ‘· · · is prime’ refers to a concept such that it yields
the True if a given argument is a prime number and the False
otherwise. What I call ‘property’ is a property of objects, and so it
corresponds to a first-level concept that maps an object to truth-
values. But it is not relevant to our discussion that a property
corresponds to a first-level concept qua such a function. The only
assumption we need for the notion of property is that a property
P is what we relate to an object > when we judge that > is %.
We certainly relate a Fregean first-level concept to an object by
such a judgment. Further, Frege himself is using ‘property’ and
‘concept’ interchangeably. He calls a characteristic of a concept
‘property’. The property being rectangular, i.e., a characteristic of
the concept being a square, is a concept such that it yields the
True iff a rectangle is given as an argument. So, it is fine to use
‘property’ and ‘concept’ interchangeably if doing so does not
cause any confusion. Hence, I do so in the remainder. Then, the
characteristics of a property % are properties an object ought to
have in order to have %. Among characteristics of %, some are
constitutive of % so that they show up in the analytic definition
of %.9 Hereafter, what I call ‘characteristic of %’ refers to such a
constitutive characteristic of%. Now, ‘characteristics’ in the passage
from ‘Thought’ should mean ‘characteristics of truth’. So, the
indefinability argument targets at truth definitions which specify
such characteristics, i.e., those of the form (TD):
8Note that characteristics of a property are ‘not its properties’ (Frege 1893,
XIV). A characteristic of a property P is a property of an object that has %.
9A primitive property %% that is not constituted by other properties still has
its characteristic, i.e., %% itself. All properties are their own characteristics.
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(TD) G is true iff G is Δ
where Δ specifies the characteristics of truth. This point is clear
by the indefinability argument presented in ‘Logic’ where Frege
identifies the target of his argument as follows:
The same [point that an absurd result is produced] would hold of
any definition of the form ‘A is true if and only if it has such-and-
such properties’. . . (Frege 1897, 128)
Now, how does this lead to the generalization of (JCor*) to (JPro)?
Frege writes:
For in a definition certain characteristics would have to be specified.
And in application to any particular case the question would al-
ways arise whether it were true that the characteristics were present
(Frege 1919a, 325).
The first statement means that if we have a truth definition of the
form (TD), truth has characteristics. The second statement must
be the answer to the question as to what we ought to do to decide
whether something is true if truth has specified characteristics.
So the following seems to capture the given passage:
(JGen) If truth has characteristics, one acknowledges the truth of
G iff one acknowledges the truth of 〈those characteristics
obtain for G〉.
Note that (JCor*) is a particular example of (JGen):
(JCor*) If truth consists in correspondence, one acknowledges the
truth of a truth-bearer G iff one acknowledges the truth of
〈G corresponds to reality〉.
‘Truth consists in correspondence’ is equivalent to ‘Truth has cor-
respondence as its characteristic’, and ‘G corresponds to reality’
is equivalent to ‘correspondence as the characteristic of truth ob-
tains for G’. At the same time, (JGen) is equivalent to (JPro). ‘Those
characteristics obtain’ must mean ‘G has the properties consti-
tutive of truth, i.e., has the property truth’ or simply ‘G is true’.
Moreover, truth having characteristics is equivalent to truth be-
ing a property.10 Hence, (JGen) comes down to the following:
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one acknowledges the truth of 〈G has the property truth〉,
i.e., the truth of 〈G is true〉.
Given that (JCor*) is an instance of (JGen) and (JGen) is equivalent to
(JPro), (JCor*) is an instance of (JPro) and (JPro) is a generalization of
(JCor*). (JPro) is indeed what the indefinability argument depends
on.
We need to note that ‘iff’ in the consequent (JPro) is to be un-
derstood in terms of constitutivity: the action described on the
left side is constituted by the action described on the right side.
This constitutivity claim implies that it is by and only by acknowl-
edging the truth of 〈G is true〉 that one acknowledges the truth of
G. The point of (JPro) is that if truth is a property, then acknowl-
edging the truth of G is constituted by acknowledging the truth
of 〈G is true〉.
10Künne (2001) would disagree. He says a characteristic mark " of a prop-
erty % must satisfy the following condition: ‘" is a property, " is · · · a
component of an analytic definition [of %], and nothing can [have %] with-
out [having "]’ (2008, 13). If he is right, a primitive property cannot have a
characteristic. However, the second condition Künne assigns on characteristics
is groundless. All Frege says about characteristics and definitions is that we
come to have a definition of a property by specifying its characteristics; that
does not imply that only a property that shows up in a definition of P can be
a %’s characteristic. Any property ‘that an object must have in order to have
%’ (1903, §150) is a characteristic of P. If we look at Künne (2001), we can see
why he takes the second condition to be necessary. Given only what Frege
says, a characteristic of P is just a necessary condition for P. Then, properties
like not both Q and not Q or Q or not Q are characteristics of P. Künne claims
that ‘the content of any concept would be so rich that nobody could have one
concept expressible in English without having all of them’ (2001, 276). But this
claim presupposes that all characteristics of P must show up in its definition.
However, all Frege says is that only characteristics of P can show up in its defi-
nition, which does not imply the presupposition at all. As I said in footnote 6,
a primitive property PP can have a characteristic, i.e., PP itself according to
Frege’s definition of characteristic.
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Given (JPro), we can easily see that (VIR) is also a part of the
indefinability argument:
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
Recall Frege’s argument against the correspondence definition:
We should have to inquire whether it is true that an idea and a real-
ity, say, correspond in the specified respect. And then we should be
confronted by a question of the same kind, and the game could be-
gin again. So the attempted explanation of truth as correspondence
breaks down (Frege 1919a, 325; numbering mine).
The first claim is the consequent of (JCor*). It is followed by the
claim that an absurd result, which breaks down the correspon-
dence definition, would be produced. So we have the following:
(VIR*) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G corresponds to reality〉, an absurd result is
produced.
The same reading is applied to the part for the generalized inde-
finability argument. Hence, we have (VIR). As I said, I explain
why the absurd result (VIR) points to is a vicious infinite regress
in the next section. We need to note that Frege takes it that the
antecedent of (VIR) by itself leads to an absurd result. Hence,
the absurd result Frege is pointing to must be something the
antecedent of (VIR) alone can produce.
Let us take stock of what we have so far:
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one acknowledges the truth of 〈G is true〉.
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
To have the absurd result under the assumption that we have a
definition of truth of the form (TD), we need the following:
(TPro) If there is a definition of truth of the form (TD), truth is a
property.
Frege endorses (TPro) when he says that ‘in a definition certain
characteristics would have to be specified’. The kind of truth def-
inition he has in mind is what makes truth have characteristics,
i.e., makes truth a property. Such a definition should have the
form (TD). Indeed, the consequent of (TPro) is obviously entailed
by the logical form (TD). Hence, the reductio that depends on
(TPro), (JPro), and (VIR) is the actual argument contained in the
passage from ‘Thought’.
Now, I turn to motivating (JPro) and (VIR). In this discussion,
we will see that the argument forces us to choose either the
Fregean conception of judgment or the intuitive idea that truth
is a property of truth-bearers.
2.2. The motivation for (VIR)
Recall (VIR):
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G is true〉, an absurd result is produced.
The absurd result is a vicious infinite regress. Consider the an-
tecedent of (VIR):
(AA) One acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges the
truth of 〈G is true〉.
We need to recall that ‘iff’ in (AA) is to be understood in terms of
constitutivity: the action described on the left side is constituted
by the action described on the right side, i.e., we perform the
former by and only by performing the latter. Now, suppose that
(AA) is true. Say that one attempts to acknowledge the truth
of a truth-bearer 1. By (AA), one can do so by and only by ac-
knowledging the truth of 〈1 is true〉. This is where the argument
depends on the assumption that thoughts are at least a kind of
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truth-bearers. 〈1 is true〉 is a truth-bearer because it is a thought.
By (AA), one can acknowledge its truth by and only by acknowl-
edging the truth of 〈〈1 is true〉 is true〉. By (AA) again, one can
perform the latter by and only by acknowledging the truth of
〈〈〈1 is true〉 is true〉 is true〉. This regress will continue end-
lessly. This infinite regress appears to be what Frege is getting at
when he says the following:
And then we should be confronted by a question of the same kind,
and the game could begin again (Frege 1919a, 325).
We can also put this result in terms of constitutivity of the act of
acknowledging the truth of G. By (AA), this act is constituted by
the act of acknowledging of 〈G is true〉. However, by (AA) again,
it is constituted by the act of acknowledging the truth of 〈〈G is
true〉 is true〉, which is again constituted by acknowledging the
truth of 〈〈〈G is true〉 is true〉 is true〉. Thus, we cannot fix what
constitutes the act of acknowledging the truth of G.
It might be objected that the infinite regress is vicious only if
acknowledging the truth of 〈?〉 is not identical with acknowledge
the truth of 〈〈?〉 is true〉. Indeed, it is tempting to think that the
former is identical with the latter for Frege. First of all, judgment
is thought-sensitive:
(Tht) Acknowledging the truth of 〈?〉 is identical with acknowl-
edging the truth of 〈@〉 iff 〈?〉 is identical with 〈@〉.
In ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892a), Frege elucidates judging
that ? as taking a step from 〈?〉 to the reference of ‘?’, i.e., one
of the truth-values, the True and the False. We will see later
what this metaphorical elucidation means. However, it already
appears clear that it implies (Tht): taking a step from 〈?〉 is
identical with taking a step from 〈@〉 iff 〈?〉 is identical with 〈@〉.
Secondly, Frege does claim that 〈?〉 is identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉.
He writes:
One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought, that 5 is a prime number, is
true.’ But. . . nothing more has been said than in the simple sentence
‘5 is a prime number’ (Frege 1892a, 64).
By (Tht), it follows that acknowledging the truth of 〈?〉 is identi-
cal with acknowledging the truth of 〈〈?〉 is true〉. Then, it seems
that the infinite regress produced by (AA) is not vicious. If the
infinite regress produced by (AA) is not vicious, it cannot be the
absurd result Frege is pointing to in this argument.
But this objection misses the point that while accepting the
identity thesis that 〈?〉 is identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉, Frege also
accepts the following:
(Diff) If ‘· · · is true’ denotes a property, 〈?〉 is different from 〈〈?〉
is true〉.
In fact, Frege puts forward (Diff) in the same passage from ‘On
Sense and Reference’.
[a] One might be tempted to regard the relation of the thought
to the True not as that of sense to reference, but rather as that of
subject to predicate. [b] One can, indeed, say: ‘The thought, that 5
is a prime number, is true.’ But [c]. . . nothing more has been said
than in the simple sentence ‘5 is a prime number.’ [d] The truth
claim arises in each case from the form of the declarative sentence,
and [e] when the latter lacks its usual force, e.g., in the mouth of
an actor upon the stage, even the sentence ‘The thought that 5 is
a prime number is true’ contains only a thought, and indeed the
same thought as the simple ‘5 is a prime number.’ It follows that
[f] the relationship of the thought to the True may not be compared
with that of subject to predicate (Frege 1892a, 64).
Through ‘the relationship of subject to predicate’, Frege refers to
the relationship of an object to a property (Frege 1892b).
The words ‘relation of a subject to a predicate’ designate two quite
different relations, according as the subject is an object or is itself a
concept (Frege 1892b, 120).
Frege says that when the subject is an object, ‘the relationship of
a subject to a predicate’ refers to the relationship of an object to a
concept, i.e., a property in our terminology.11 ‘The thought that
11In particular, it refers to the relationship of an object falling under a concept,
i.e., an object having a property (Frege 1892b, 120).
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?’ is saturated—i.e., has no argument place—so that it refers to
an object; a thought is an object. Therefore, ‘the relationship of
subject to predicate’ here refers to the relationship of an object
to a property. Frege is arguing that the truth-value True is not
a property of thoughts but a reference attached to thoughts. By
[a], he is taking into consideration theorists who regard the True
as a property thoughts have. Here is how the argument runs:
(P1) If the True is a property, then ‘· · · is true’ denotes the prop-
erty.
(P2) If ‘· · · is true’ denotes a property, 〈?〉 is different from 〈〈?〉
is true〉.
(P3) 〈?〉 is identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉.
(C1) ∴ ‘· · · is true’ does not denote a property.
(C2) ∴ The True is not a property.
(P3) can be read off from [c]–[e]. [c] is just (P3). [d] and the
first half of [e] are dealing with our misconception of ‘true’ such
that, in ‘〈?〉 is true’, ‘true’ adds to 〈?〉 the assertoric force as
a sense added to 〈?〉. According to Frege, this misconception
is a main reason that hinders people from realizing that 〈?〉 is
identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉 (compare Frege 1915). Establishing
that the assertoric force is not attached to ‘true’ at all, Frege
repeats (P3) in the second half of [e]. Then, he directly proceeds
to the conclusion in [f]. This confirms that Frege is committed to
(P2), which is also strongly suggested by ‘but’ between [b] and
[c]. Without (P1), Frege cannot proceed from (C1) to (C2). Also,
(P1) seems to explain Frege’s move from [a] to [b].
If this reformulation of the argument is acceptable, then it
shows that Frege is committed to (Diff), i.e., (P2). By our assump-
tion that there is a true definition of truth of the form (TD), truth
is a property. By (Diff) and (Tht), acknowledging the truth of 〈?〉
differs from acknowledging the truth of 〈〈?〉 is true〉. Hence, the
objection to (VIR) does not obtain.
(Diff) is arguably plausible; saying that snow is white certainly
seems to be radically different from saying that a thought has a
certain property. Presumably, this is why, in the literature, it is
hard to find out a theory of truth that takes truth to be a property
and takes 〈?〉 to be identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉. For instance,
Horwich (1998), who takes truth to be a property in a minimal
sense—i.e, in the sense that ‘true’ is a legitimate predicate—still
takes 〈?〉 to be different from 〈〈?〉 is true〉 because truth is a
property.
A number of readings of the indefinability argument takes
the identity thesis to be a part of the argument (compare Künne
2008 or Soames 1999). But Frege’s commitment to (Diff) provides
a reason to doubt this claim. In Frege’s own understanding,
the identity thesis would not obtain if truth were a property.
However, the argument assumes that truth is a property. Under
that assumption, Frege cannot put forward the identity thesis.
Doing so goes against (Diff).
Note that the argument from ‘On Sense and Reference’ con-
cludes that truth is not a property of thoughts. The indefinability
argument can lead to the same conclusion. Given (JPro) and (VIR):
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one acknowledges the truth of 〈G has the property truth〉,
i.e., 〈G is true〉;
(VIR) If one acknowledges the truth of G iff one acknowledges
the truth of 〈G is true〉, an absurd result is produced;
the assumption that truth is a property will lead to the same
infinite regress. Hence, we should deny the assumption that
truth is a property of truth-bearers, which implies that truth
is not a property of thoughts. Therefore, the argument in ‘On
Sense and Reference’ and the indefinability argument are dif-
ferent arguments to the conclusion that truth is not a property.
The difference is that while the former depends on the identity
between 〈?〉 and 〈〈?〉 is true〉, the latter does not.
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One might argue that regarding the indefinability argument as
an argument that truth is not a property is implausible because
the conclusion Frege draws at the end of the argument is that
‘the content of the word is sui generis and indefinable’ (1919a,
327). But the final conclusion of the argument in our reading is
also the indefinability of truth—that there is no definition of the
form ‘G is true iff G is Δ’. Surely, the conclusion we have under
the suggested reading is, precisely speaking, the indefinability
of truth as a property. However, Frege makes it clear that his tar-
gets are attempts to define truth as a property. If so, it is only
natural to interpret the argument as an argument to the inde-
finability of truth as a property. Hence, my suggested reading
properly captures the final conclusion Frege puts at the end of
the argument.
Still, is it reasonable to think that it is an intermediate conclu-
sion of the argument that truth is not a property? The answer
is, I believe, ‘Yes’ according to the passage from ’Thought’. In a
nutshell, what Frege literally says there is that if truth has charac-
teristics, an absurd result—which we have identified as a vicious
infinite regress—is produced with respect to the act of deciding
whether something is true. As we have seen, truth has charac-
teristics just in case it is a property. Thus, it is directly from the
assumption that truth is a property that Frege draws the infinite
regress. My suggested reading captures this point.
One might still argue Frege’s other remarks in ‘Thought’ show
that he takes truth to be a property and ‘true’ a predicate. For
instance, he writes:
We cannot recognize a property of a thing without at the same time
finding the thought this thing has this property to be true. So with
every property of a thing, there is tied up a property of a thought,
namely truth (Frege 1919a, 328).12
In reply, what Frege is pointing to here is simply the identity
thesis that 〈?〉 is always identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉. To recognize
12Indeed, Frege repeats the same point in ‘Logic’ (1897, 129).
a property % of an object > is to judge that > is %. Then, Frege’s
point is that when we judge that > is %, we also judge that 〈> is %〉
is true. This point is completely explained by his commitment
to the identity thesis. The fact that what Frege has in his mind
here is the identity thesis is also shown by the fact that the above
point is reinforced by the following:
It is also worth noticing that the sentence ‘I smell the scent of violets’
has just the same content as the sentence ‘It is true that I smell the
scent of violets’. So, it seems, then, that nothing is added to the
thought by my ascribing to it the property of truth (Frege 1919a,
328).
What Frege argues for based on the identity thesis, as we have
seen in ‘On Sense and Reference’, is that truth is not a property.
Frege is more explicit about this point in ‘Logic in Mathematics’
written in 1914. It is right after repeating the same argument we
have seen in ‘On Sense and Reference’ that he writes:
Showing. . . that truth (Wahrheit) is not a property of sentences or
thoughts, as language might lead one to suppose, this consideration
confirms that a thought is related to its truth-value as the sense of
a sign is to its reference (Frege 1914, 234).
What Frege is trying to establish in ‘Thought’ is, in the end, also
that truth is not a property. Right after the above passages, he
remarks:
The reference of the word ‘true’ seems to be altogether sui generis.
May we not be dealing here with something which cannot be called
a property in the ordinary sense at all? In spite of this doubt I will
begin by expressing myself in accordance with ordinary usage,
until some more appropriate way of speaking is found (Frege 1914,
234).
‘Thought’ is an article written for readers who are unfamiliar
with, and even potentially against, Frege’s logical framework,
specifically, German Idealists.13 Although the article is for such
13‘Thought’ is published in Beiträge zur Philosophie des deutschen Idealismus I.
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non-logicians and Frege does not provide a new way of talking
about truth in the remainder, he still expresses his discomfort
with the ordinary usage in which ‘true’ is a predicate and truth
is a property. This shows Frege’s strong commitment to the claim
that truth is not a property.
Scholars like Heck (2007, 2012) and Künne (2008) maintain that
Frege cannot avoid being committed to the property of truth.
In Frege’s mature framework, all true sentences have the True
as their reference. Thoughts are modes of presentation of sen-
tential references. Thus, true thoughts—i.e., the senses of true
sentences—share the property being a mode of presentation of the
True. These commentators’ point is that because there are such
properties shared by all true thoughts, Frege ought to admit that
truth is such a property of thoughts insofar as he retains his
framework. But this inference is invalid. To admit the existence
of the properties shared by true thoughts is one thing, and to
identify truth with one of such properties is another. Accepting
such properties does not immediately commit one to the claim
that one of such properties is truth. One can deny that truth is
a property while accepting the existence of properties shared by
thoughts that refer to the True. Frege does deny that truth is a
property.
The real question, one might say, is why we should accept (AA)
just because we accept that truth is a property. Most of theorists
in the literature on truth accept that truth is a property; but that
does not seem to automatically make them committed to (AA).
Why does Frege think that we have to accept (AA) if we accept
that truth is a property? In other words, why does he think that
we have to accept (JPro):
(JPro) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one acknowledges the truth of 〈G is true〉?
Let us turn to this question.
2.3. The motivation for (JPro) and what the argument
really shows
Heck (2012) and Pagin (2001) also take (JPro) to be a premise of
the indefinability argument. For instance, Heck writes:
[Say] we do think of truth as a property of thoughts. Then, the idea
that judgment is admission of a thought’s truth becomes the idea
that judging is a form of predication: judging is predicating truth
of a thought. . . Predication in this sense is itself a sort of judgment:
To predicate truth of the thought that ? is just to judge that the
thought that ? is true. . . (Heck 2012, 47)
Heck is inferring (JPro) by the following two propositions:
(Q1) If truth is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff
one predicates the property truth of G.
(Q2) One predicates a property % of an object > iff one acknowl-
edges the truth of 〈> is %〉.
Pagin (2001, 5) presents the same inference to (JPro). I believe that
an inference similar to this is going on when Frege is putting
forward (JPro). But one might doubt that this is the inference
underlying (JPro) because (Q2) is easily challengeable. First, note
that the verb ‘predicate’ in (Q1) and (Q2) indicates the committal
act of predication—the act of predication that is committed to the
correctness of predication.14 Recall that (AA)—the consequent of
(JPro)—is the constitutivity claim that one acknowledges the truth
of G by and only by acknowledging the truth of 〈G is true〉. We can
have such a constitutivity claim only if (Q2) is also understood
as such a claim, i.e., the claim that one predicates % of G by and
14One problem is that Frege does not endorse such a committal conception
of predication. For him, predicating a property % of an object > is grasping 〈>
is %〉 (e.g., Frege 1892a, 1897, 1906b, etc). Predicating as grasping a thought
does not include a commitment to the correctness of predication. Of course,
we can still define committal predication in the framework. Basically, (Q2) is
just such a definition.
Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy vol. 9 no. 5 [10]
only by acknowledging the truth of 〈> is %〉. However, why do
we have to accept (Q2) as such? One can deny (Q2), arguing that
we acknowledge the truth of 〈> is %〉 by and only by predicating
% of >. Hence, one might insist that Frege would not take such
an easily challengeable claim to be true, and so that the above
inference is not what underlies (JPro).
However, I still believe that the above inference suggested by
Heck and Pagin is what Frege has in his mind. We should first
note that we can find a rational for (Q2) in Frege’s conception of
judgment: (Q2) turns out to be true in the Fregean conception.
Let > be an object and % be a property objects can have. Consider
the following descriptions of act-types:
(A1) Predicating % of >,
(A2) Judging that > is %, and
(A3) Acknowledging the truth of 〈> is %〉.
Two preliminary points. First, as we have seen, (A3) constitutes
(A2) in the Fregean conception: it is by and only by performing
(A3) that we perform (A2). Secondly, it seems reasonable to say
that (A1) is equivalent to (A2): to committally predicate P of > is
to judge that > is %.15 Now, the question is which of (A1) and (A2)
is more fundamental. There are several reasons to believe that
(A2) is more fundamental than (A1) in Frege. In ‘Boole’s Logical
Calculus and Begriffsschrift’ written in his early career, Frege
says that unlike theorists like Boole who take concept-formation
and predication to the ’logically primitive activity’ (1880, 15),
he takes judgment to be such an activity.16 Thus, judgment is
conceptually prior to predication:
So instead of putting a judgment together out of individual as
subject and an already previously formed concept as predicate, we
15We will discuss this point in Section 3.1.
16To say that a notion is primitive is not to say that we cannot say anything
about it. According to Frege, we can still provide an elucidation for a primi-
tive notion like judgment. Acknowledgment of the truth of a thought is his
elucidation of judgment.
do the opposite and arrive at a concept [i.e., predicate] by splitting
up the content of possible judgment (Frege 1880, 17).
Thus, judgment is not to be understood in terms of a combination
of a subject and a predicate, i.e., in terms of an act of predica-
tion.17 In Frege’s mature career, predication is still to be sharply
distinguished from judgment:
. . . Even in logical works, predicating is confused with judging
(Frege 1906b, 185).
In ‘On Sense and Reference’, Frege elucidates judging as taking
a step from a thought to its truth-value. Then, he writes:
By combining subject and predicate, one reaches only a thought,
never passes. . . from a thought to its truth value (Frege 1892a, 64).
Here, we need to be a little bit careful because what Frege means
by ‘predicating’ or ‘combining subject and predicate’ is not com-
mittal predication like (A1), but grasping a thought without be-
ing committed to its truth. What should be noted in addition is
that, for Frege in his mature career, ‘predication’ in his elucida-
tions of logical notions consistently refers to the act of grasping
a thought. The notion of committal predication never shows
up in his elucidation of judgment, or even in his philosophi-
cal elucidations of other logical notions. Moreover, Frege criti-
cizes the attempt to understand judgment in terms of committal
predication—most notably in ‘Negation’ (1919b). So, commit-
tal predication like (A1) does not play any explanatory role in
Frege’s mature framework. Thus, (A1) ought to be understood
in terms of (A2), but not the other way around. We will revisit
this point shortly.
In conclusion, the Fregean conception of judgment thus entails
(Q2), i.e., that (A1) is constituted by (A3). Again, from (Q1) and
(Q2), (JPro) follows.
17For the motivation of this view, see Textor (2010, §2).
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Then, the question is whether this rationale is what underlies
(JPro). One might answer ‘No’. If the above rationale underlies
(JPro), the indefinability argument immediately encounters the
following challenge. If the Fregean conception of judgment were
the only plausible conception, (Q2) is justified. But there is an
arguable alternative to the Fregean conception of judgment as
we have described at the beginning of Section 2.3. Such a non-
Fregean conception of judgment has recently been championed
by Peter Hanks (2011, 2015, 2018). For Hanks, predicating is the
fundamental activity. Specifically, in Hanks’s framework, (A2) is
reduced to (A1).18 There is no constitutivity relationship between
(A2) and (A3). The latter is predicating truth of 〈o is %〉, which
is an act-type different from (A1) and thus (A2). So (Q2) does
not obtain for Hanks; (A1) is not achieved by and only by doing
(A3). Thus, theorists such as Hanks who go against the Fregean
conception of judgment would not accept (Q2). To put it in a
different way, what we can reasonably regard as obviously true is
not (Q2), but only the following:
(Q2*) If the Fregean conception of judgment is correct, (Q2) is
true.
Therefore, Frege needs to show, at least, that the Fregean con-
ception of judgment constitutes a better theory of judgment than
other conceptions. However, he does not even mention this al-
ternative. This might raise a doubt against the above rationale
for (JPro).
However, I believe, the suggested rationale for (JPro) is what
Frege has in mind. As we have seen, Frege basically refuses to
understand judgment in terms of predication. There are at least
three reasons why he does so.19 First, Frege maintains that if we
understand judging in terms of connecting subject and predicate,
i.e., predicating, we cannot make sense of the distinction between
18For Hanks, predication is inherently committal. See ch.3 of Hanks (2015).
19For the further discussion about why Frege refuses to understand judg-
ment in terms of predication, see Textor (2010, §4).
grasping a thought and acknowledging a thought’s truth (Frege
1919b, 354). Secondly, he believes that understanding judging
in terms of predicating leads to unnecessary difficulties with
understanding the nature of rejecting (1919b, 354–57). Lastly,
he maintains that analyzing contents of judgments in terms of
subject and predicate leads to constant misunderstanding of the
logical structures of those contents (1892b, 119–20).20 All these
reasons are certainly disputable and have details that need thor-
ough examination. But what matters for us is that if Frege were
to regard these reasons as sufficient for rejecting the predication
view of judgment, then he would take (JPro) to be justified. If so,
Frege does not need to hesitate to put it forward in the paper
where he introduces his logical insights to people who are new
to them.
Recall that the indefinability argument leads to the conclusion
that truth is not a property. Also, recall that this is not Frege’s
only argument that truth is not a property. He provides another
argument that truth is not a property—putting its conclusion ex-
plicitly. The soundness of that argument hinges on the identity
thesis that 〈?〉 is identical with 〈〈?〉 is true〉. Frege would prob-
ably notice that such an argument cannot convince people who
simply deny the identity thesis. Then, he has a reason to come
up with an argument that does not depend on the identity thesis.
If my suggested exegesis is along the right lines, the indefinabil-
ity argument is the result of Frege’s attempt to discover such an
argument; he thinks that his conception of judgment to which
he is firmly committed provides a sufficient reason to deny that
truth is a property.
Frege’s indefinability argument under my suggested reading
provides an important lesson. The Fregean conception of judg-
ment, under which judging is making a commitment to the truth
of a proposition as an abstract entity that represents things in a
20Thus, Frege says that ‘it would be best to banish the words ‘subject’ and
‘predicate’ from logic entirely’ (1892b, 120).
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way, is a popular point of view.21 Frege’s argument establishes
that the Fregean conception is incompatible with the ordinary
view that truth is a property of truth-bearers. That is, the follow-
ing is arguably true:
(JPro*) If the Fregean conception of judgment is true and truth
is a property, one acknowledges the truth of G iff one
acknowledges the truth of 〈G is true〉.
If we assume that the Fregean conception is true and that truth
is a property, we come to have the vicious infinite regress. We
ought to abandon at least one of the assumptions.
Frege’s choice is to abandon the ordinary thought that truth
is a property. Hence, he ought to provide an alternative concep-
tion of judgment qua acknowledgment of truth in which truth
is an object. He does provide such an alternative in ‘On Sense
and Reference’ and other mature works. This reversely suggests
that Frege is attempting to justify his search for an alternative
understanding of the Fregean conception of judgment when he
builds up his arguments against the idea that truth is a property.
I turn to this alternative provided by Frege.
3. Judgment as Non-Judgmental Identification
In a nutshell, I argue, Frege takes judging that ? qua acknowledg-
ing the truth of 〈?〉 as identifying the truth-value True, which is
an object, with the truth-value of 〈?〉. In ‘Comments on Sense
and Reference’, Frege writes:
In the cases we first encounter the argument [of a concept] is an
object, it is to these cases that we shall mainly confine ourselves
here. . . If we complete the name of an concept with a proper name,
we obtain a sentence whose sense is a thought; and this sentence
has a truth-value as its reference. To acknowledge this reference as that
of the True (as the True) is to judge that the object which is taken
21See ch.1 of Hanks (2015).
as the argument falls under the concept (Frege 1892b, 119; italics
mine).
There is a further rationale beneath this elucidation. We can find
it in ‘On Sense and Reference’ where Frege elucidates judging
as ‘taking a step from a thought to its reference’. I analyze this
elucidation in Section 3.1. This analysis provides a reason to
think that the notion of identification in terms of which Frege
elucidates judgment is that of non-judgmental identification. In
Section 3.2, I show the theoretical merits of taking judgments to
be such non-judgmental identifications.
3.1. Frege’s own conception of judgment
One of the important themes in ‘On Sense and Reference’, which
has attracted less attention than others themes in it, is his eluci-
dation of judgment in terms of the sense-reference distinction.
As we have said, in this paper, Frege elucidates that to judge that
? is to take a step from 〈?〉 to its truth-value:
But so much should already be clear, that in every judgment, no
matter how trivial, the step from the level of thoughts to the level of
reference (the objective) has already been taken (Frege 1892a, 64).
Judgments can be regarded as advances from a thought to [its]
truth value (Frege 1892a, 65).
Giving this metaphorical elucidation, Frege does not even briefly
explain how we must understand this elucidation as if he believes
that he has already done so in the previous parts of the paper.
Indeed, he leaves hints for this metaphor in the earlier passages.
Preliminary comments on truth-values. Frege takes saturated
terms, i.e., terms without an empty place for an argument term
such as ‘the author of Grundgesetze’ or ‘Frege’, to denote an object.
Objects are saturated, i.e., have no empty place for an argument.
Unsaturated terms, i.e., terms with empty places for argument
terms such as ‘· · · is prime’ or ‘the sum of · · · and · · · ’, denote
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functions.22 Functions are unsaturated, i.e., have empty places
for arguments. Now, sentences do not have any empty place; they
are saturated. Thus, what they refer to are objects. Truth-values
are objects, and sentences are proper names of truth-values, so
to speak.23
A hint to Frege’s elucidation of judging as taking a step from
a thought to its truth-value is that we can take the same kind of
step with a non-sentential name like ‘Odysseus’. Frege writes:
. . . It is doubtful whether the name ‘Odysseus,’. . . has refer-
ence. . . Whoever does not admit the name has reference can neither
apply nor withhold the predicate. But in that case it would be su-
perfluous to advance to the reference of the name (Frege 1892a, 62;
italics mine).
It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the
sense to the reference [of a name such as ‘Odysseus’] (Frege 1892a, 63;
italics mine).
Thus, we can take a step from the sense of ‘Odysseus’ to its
reference. In addition to this, we can acquire one more hint
about the act of taking a step from a proper name’s sense to its
reference: there is no point in taking a step from the sense of a
name to its reference if we do not recognize the existence of the
name’s reference.
Frege provides further hints in his solution to ‘Frege’s
puzzle’—the difference in cognitive value between ‘0 = 0’ and
‘0 = 1’. A part of his solution is the famous distinction between
senses and references. However, there is something more to
Frege’s solution. He writes:
() The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is
sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to
which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of
the reference. . . () Comprehensive knowledge of the reference [of
22Properties are first-level functions referred to by predicates like ‘· · · is
prime’. Their value for given arguments is always a truth-value.
23For Frege’s elucidation of saturation, objects, and concepts, see, e.g., Frege
(1891, 1892a,c,b, 1906b,a, 1914).
a name] would require us to be able to say immediately whether
any given sense belongs to it. () To such knowledge we never
attain (Frege 1892a, 57–58).
The reference of a proper name is an object. Its sense illuminates
a single aspect of the name’s reference if the name indeed has
a reference. Many different senses can belong to one object, i.e.,
there can be many different names with different senses that
refer to the object. That is what the second half of () says. Now,
given (), Frege appears to say by () that
(SbO) We can never have the ability to immediately decide
whether any given sense belongs to an object.
Say that I already grasp the sense of a name ‘N1’ and know that
the name has a reference. Say ‘N2’ is an arbitrary name the sense
of which I do not grasp yet. Now, (SbO) entails that I cannot know
whether the sense of ‘N2’ belongs to N1 only by grasping the
sense. If my grasping the sense of ‘N2’ immediately lets me know
whether it belongs to N1, then (SbO) is false because in that case
we do have the ability to immediately decide whether any given
sense belongs to an object. This is Frege’s explanation of why
we cannot know that the Morning Star is the Evening Star even
when we do grasp the senses of both names. We cannot decide
whether the sense of ‘Morning Star’ (‘Evening Star’) belongs to
the Evening Star (the Morning Star) only by grasping the sense.
But we know whether NG is NH if and only if we know whether
〈NG〉 (〈NH〉) belongs to NH (NG). Thus, grasping the sense of
a proper name ‘NG’ or ‘NH’ alone does not let us achieve the
knowledge of identity ‘NG =NH’.
What is to be noted is that there is one more thing we can-
not know merely by grasping the sense of a proper name, i.e.,
whether the name has a reference:
In grasping a sense, one is not certainly assured of a reference (Frege
1892a, 58).
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Consider the name ‘the celestial body most distant from the
Earth’ (Frege 1892a, 58). We appear to satisfy the condition for
grasping the sense of a name specified in (). However, we do
not know whether it has a reference.
Let us take stock. Now I use the sign ‘〈· · ·〉’, which we used
to mean ‘the thought that · · · ’, to mean ‘the sense of the name
“· · · ” ’. Let ‘N’ be any proper name. Only by grasping 〈N〉 we
cannot tell whether
(SR1) ‘N’ has a reference.
Let ‘Na’ be an arbitrary name such that i) its sense is different
from 〈N〉, ii) it sense is already grasped by us, and iii) its reference
is acknowledged by us. Only by grasping〈N〉 we cannot tell
whether
(SR2) N is identical with Na.24
Note that trying to decide whether (SR2) is the case has no point
if we deny (SR1)—just as taking a step from the sense of a name
to its reference has no point if we deny (SR1). So, a tempting hy-
pothesis is that to take a step from a name’s sense to its reference
is to decide whether (SR2) is the case.
We already have a reason to think that taking a step from the
sense of ‘N’ to its reference is deciding that N is identical with
Na, i.e., to identify N with Na. For, as we have seen, judging that
? is identifying the True with ?. Frege writes in ‘Comments on
Sense and Reference’:
To acknowledge this reference [of a sentence] as that of the True (as
the True) is to judge. . . (Frege 1892b, 119).
24In Frege the only exceptions to this would be the cases where both names
express logical laws of Begriffsschrift. This is because his elucidations of those
laws in Grundgesetze, which show—not prove—that they are true, can be ar-
guably taken to appeal entirely to senses of component expressions. Com-
mentators like Heck (2012) claim that Frege is trying to provide metalinguistic
justifications for those laws that entirely depend on the senses of expressions.
The same point is discovered in Begriffsschrift. Begriffsschrift en-
dorses ‘ ’ as a device for making an assertion—the verbal coun-
terpart of judgment. In Begriffsschrift, asserting that 2+3 equals 5
is equivalent to writing down the following:
2 + 3 = 5
In ‘Function and Concept’, Frege writes:
To this end [of asserting] I make use of a vertical stroke at the left
end of the horizontal, so that, e.g., by writing
2 + 3 = 5
we assert that 2+3 equals 5. Thus here we are not just writing down
a truth-value, as in
2 + 3 = 5,
but also at the same time saying that it is the True (Frege 1891, 34;
italics mine).
Since sentences are proper names, they can appear on one side
of an identity sign. Frege is saying that to assert that 2+3 equals
5 is to say that (2+3 equals 5) is identical with the True, i.e., to
identify (2+3 equals 5) with the True. So, both judging and its
verbal counterpart asserting are making such an identification.
Recall that to judge that ? is to take a step from 〈?〉 to the truth-
value—the reference—of ‘?’. Therefore, to take a step from 〈?〉 to
the truth-value of ‘?’ is to identify (2+3=5) with the True. More
generally, we can say, to take a step from the sense of ‘N’ to its
reference is to identity N with the reference of a name such that
its sense and the existence of its reference are already known to
us. In the case of judging that ?, it is always the True that one
identifies ? with.
Two related points. First, is the True an object whose existence
is known to us? According to Frege, truth-values are the first
two logical objects known to us—where a logical object is an ob-
ject that can be known to us by our logical faculty (Frege 1980,
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191).25 ‘The True’ and ‘the False’ are the names Frege coins for
these two logical objects. Hence, in a judgment, we identify one
of those known objects, i.e., the True, with the reference of a sen-
tence. Secondly, why does Frege all of sudden mention the act of
advancing from the sense of ‘Odysseus’ to its reference, which
is identifying Odysseus with an object, where he is considering
a subject who does not admit that ‘Odysseus’ has a reference?
If a subject thinks it is possible for the name to have a reference
and attempts to find out whether it does, a natural way such a
subject can pursue is to attempt to identify Odysseus with an
object whose existence is already known by way of the reference
of a different name, e.g., ‘the ancient Greek general mentioned
in such-and-such historical records’. Such an attempt, of course,
is pointless for a subject who clearly denies that ‘Odysseus’ has
reference. If Frege associates the act of accepting the existence
of the reference of ‘Odysseus’ with that of identifying Odysseus
with such a known object, it is natural for him to point out that
such an identification is pointless for a subject who denies the
existence of its reference in the context where he considers such
a subject.
If my interpretation is along the right lines, then to judge that
? is identifying ? with the True. This interpretation, however,
will raise an immediate objection given our discussion about the
indefinability argument. For one can contend that to identify an
object >1 with >2 is in the end to judge that >1 is identical with
>2. If so, we can judge that ?, i.e., identify ? with the True, only
by judging that ? is the True. Then, the vicious infinite regress
to which the indefinability argument appeals to is produced. It
is a case of the infinite regress that we would have if truth were
to be reduced down to the property being identical with the True.
But it is not a given fact at all that all acts of identification are
those of identity judgment. Say I mishear the name of Jane as
‘Jean’ when she introduces herself as a virtue ethicist. Now, in
25For this point, see Shramko and Wansing (2018, §1.3).
my conversation with my other colleague, I say ‘Jean is a virtue
ethicist’. My intention is obviously to talk about Jane. Thus,
it seems to be plausible to say that I am (mistakenly) speaker-
referring to Jane by ‘Jean’. However, to say so does not fully
capture what is going on. In my assertion, I am using the sentence
in its literal sense. Hence, my intention is partly to talk about the
reference of ‘Jean’. In short, my assertion is about both Jane and
the reference of ‘Jean’. What is going on seems to be captured
well by the following:
(SR) my speaker-referring to Jane by ‘Jean’ is an act of identify-
ing Jane with the reference of ‘Jean’.
(SR) explains why my assertion concerns both Jane and the ref-
erence of ‘Jean’: that is because my speaker-reference is an act
of identification. Nevertheless, my act of speaker-reference is by
no means an act of identity judgment, i.e., an acknowledgment
of the truth of 〈Jane is Jean〉.
It is not my intention to develop a general explanation about
speaker-reference. I am merely exploring the possibility of non-
judgmental identification. In fact, the idea of non-judgmental
identification has already been explored by theorists like Mil-
likan (1998, 2000) and Camp (2002). For instance, Millikan (2000)
writes:
You don’t make claims when you stand up to walk just because
it’s possible you could trip and fall. Similarly, you don’t make
claims when you develop substance concepts or when you mark
identities in thought. Erroneous identification is not failure on the
level of know-that but failure on the level of know-how. . . There is
no such thing as an identity judgment. . . Grasping an identity is
not remotely like harboring an intentional attitude [i.e., making a
judgment]. Similarly, mistaking an identity is not harboring a false
belief [i.e., making a false judgment] (Millikan 2000, §12.7).
When we say or think that O1 is O2, Millikan argues, what we do
is rather to realize the ‘overlap’ (Millikan 2000, 144) of two rep-
resentational vehicles over a single object. The parallel between
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Millikan and Frege is remarkable given that Frege describes the
act of identifying O1 with O2 as that of deciding whether the
sense of ‘O1’ (‘O2’), i.e., the content, belongs to O2 (O1).
Again it is not my intention to be committed to the inter-
pretation of Millikan’s framework or the comparison of Frege
to Millikan.26 What is important to us is that Frege ought to
depend on the notion of non-judgmental identification when
he characterizes judgment as identification. Otherwise, Frege’s
elucidation of judgment as identification produces the vicious
infinite regress he is warning in the indefinability argument.
For, in order to judge that ?, now we have to judge that ? is the
True. One might object that Frege is committing a plain mis-
take here. But saying so is too uncharitable to be accepted. It is
more so given that Frege is appealing to a metaphor in order to
elucidate the act of judgment—what he simply takes to be identi-
fication with the True elsewhere.27 If he intended to characterize
judging that ? as judging that ? is the True, then he would not
provide such a cryptic metaphorical elucidation of it. Further-
more, there is no reason to consider judgment as ‘peculiar and
incomparable’ (1892a, 65). But if Frege takes judgment to consist
in non-judgmental identification, and believes that there is no
further way to explain the nature of non-judgmental identifica-
tion other than providing such a metaphorical elucidation, he
has a reason to regard judgment as peculiar and incomparable.
26Frege differs from Millikan in that unlike Millikan, he accepts that there
are judgmental identifications. However, both of them still seem to agree
that non-judgmental identification is recognition of the convergence of two
different contents on a single object. On top of that, Millikan further claims
that there is nothing like the relation of identity or identity propositions. Thus,
for her, there cannot be identity judgments. On the contrary, Frege accepts the
existence of identity, identity thoughts, and identity judgments. Thus, Frege
can still accept judgmental identification. I come back to this point at the end
of this section.
27‘Comments on Sense and Reference’ (1892b) where Frege takes judgment
to be identification of the True is written around the time when ‘On Sense and
Reference’ (1892a) is published.
Given that Frege takes judgment to be identification of the
True, the most charitable reading is to take the kind of identifi-
cation constitutive of judgment to be non-judgmental identifica-
tion. The passages from ‘On Sense and Reference’ provide some
reasons to go for this reading.
Before wrapping up this section, I would like to address an
objection to my reading.28 The objection starts with the claim
that if Frege recognizes non-judgmental identification, he should
also recognize non-judgmental (committal) predication, i.e., the
act of predicating without making any judgment. For instance,
to (committally) predicate % of > non-judgmentally is to make
the predication without making the judgment that > is %. If
one recognizes such a non-judgmental conception of predica-
tion, then one can apply it to judgment qua acknowledgment.
Specifically, one can maintain that to judge that ?, i.e., to ac-
knowledge the truth of 〈?〉, is to predicate the property truth of
〈?〉 non-judgmentally. If judgment is elucidated in terms of non-
judgmental predication, then we can avoid the vicious infinite
regress. Therefore, the objection argues, Frege makes the in-
definability argument collapse if he recognizes non-judgmental
identification. This raises a doubt against my interpretation of
judgment in Frege as non-judgmental identification, and further
against my interpretation of the indefinability argument as an ar-
gument from his conception of judgment to the conclusion that
truth is not a property.
However, it is not the case that if one recognizes non-
judgmental identification, one should also recognize non-
judgmental predication. The claim obtains only in the case that
to identifying >1 with >2 non-judgmentally is predicating being >1
(or >2) of >2 (or >1). However, if one accepts that predicating % of
> is equivalent to judging that > is %—without saying which con-
stitutes which—then one can simply say that non-judgmental
identification is also non-predicative identification. Hence, one
28I thank the anonymous reviewer who has informed me of this objection.
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who recognizes non-judgmental identification does not have to
recognize non-judgmental predication. To take non-judgmental
identification to be non-judgmental predication additionally re-
quires one to reject the equivalence between predication and
judgment.
Frege seems to be committed to the claim that predicating
% of > is equivalent to judging that > is %. He sharply distin-
guishes judgment from predication, and takes the former to be
conceptually prior to the latter. So, if there is such a thing like
(committal) predication, it must be understood as constituted by
judgment for Frege. If so, he must be committed to the point that
predicating % of > is equivalent to judging that > is %. This equiv-
alence seems plausible. It rather appears implausible to say that
one can perform the act of predicating % of > without thereby judg-
ing that > is %. One might object that it is equally implausible
to say that one can identify >1 with >2 without thereby judg-
ing that >1 is >2. However, that is controversial. The case of my
speaker-reference to Jane by ‘Jean’ shows that it is arguably pos-
sible to identify Jane with the reference of ‘Jean’ without thereby
asserting—verbal counterpart of judging—that Jane is the refer-
ence of ‘Jean’. Similar ideas have been advocated by theorists like
Millikan. But the notion of non-judgmental predication does not
have such support in the current literature.
In any event, Frege never develops the notion of non-
judgmental predication. It is not evident that Frege rejects non-
judgmental predication for certain reasons or he simply does
not see the possibility of such predication because he takes the
equivalence between judgment and predication to be obvious.
What is important to us is that given Frege’s commitment to
the equivalence, he does not have to recognize non-judgmental
predication just because he recognizes non-judgmental identifi-
cation. Then, the basis of the current objection is undermined.
Furthermore, given that the equivalence between judgment and
predication is a part of Frege’s conception of judgment, the gist of
the indefinability argument—the point that if Frege’s conception
of judgment is correct, then truth is not a property—still obtains
because the conception blocks the possibility of non-judgmental
predication.
One might still object that it is a more charitable reading than
mine to say that Frege recognizes non-judgmental predication
and takes judgment to be non-judgmental predication of the
property truth, and to read the indefinability argument in a dif-
ferent way. But I disagree. As we have seen, Frege goes against
any attempt to understand judgment in terms of predication.
Also, he never develops the non-judgmental conception of pred-
ication. On the contrary, Frege certainly attempts to understand
judgment in terms of identification of the True and to try to elu-
cidate identification constitutive of judgment by the metaphor
‘taking a step’. More importantly, Frege explicitly denies that
truth is a property. One might retort that if Frege indeed accepts
that judgment is constituted by non-judgmental predication of
truth, my interpretation of the indefinability argument collapses,
and so that there is no reason to believe that he denies that truth is
a property. But we should not forget that the indefinability argu-
ment is not the only argument that truth is not a property. Frege
has a different argument for the same conclusion—the one in
‘On Sense and Reference’ that depends on the identity thesis—
that he still retains in ‘Logic in Mathematics’ (1914) long after
the first appearance of the indefinability argument. He makes
the conclusion of this independent argument quite explicit:
Showing. . . that truth (Wahrheit) is not a property of sentences or
thoughts, as language might lead one to suppose, this consideration
confirms that a thought is related to its truth-value as the sense of
a sign is to its reference (Frege 1914, 234).
Thus, the reading suggested by this objection is much more un-
charitable than my interpretation.
If my suggested reading is indeed the most charitable reading,
we can say that Frege accepts the following:
(FJ) To judge that ? is to identify the True as ? non-judgmentally.
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That is how Frege understands the act of acknowledging the
‘truth’ of a thought. His conception of judgment is unique in that
it takes truth to be an object and denies that acknowledgment
of truth is acknowledgment of the property truth. The fact that
Frege comes up with this unique conception of judgment shows
that he is well aware of the result of his indefinability argument,
i.e., that he cannot hold both his conception of judgment as truth
acknowledgment and the view that takes truth as a property.
One point to be noted is that Frege—unlike Millikan—still
accepts judgmental identification. Begriffsschrift is full of judg-
ments with equations. What I have said is perfectly compatible
with Frege’s acceptance of judgmental identification. To make
a judgmental identification of >1 with >2 is simply to judge that
>1 is >2, i.e., acknowledging the truth of the identity thought
〈>1 is >2〉. The judgmental identification of >1 and >2 consists
in non-judgmental identification of the True, i.e., the act of non-
judgmentally identifying the True with the truth-value of 〈>1
is >2〉. That is how judgmental identification in Frege can be
understood under my interpretation.
The remainder of the paper will be dedicated to demonstrating
the theoretical benefits of Frege’s unique conception by showing
how it copes with Peter Hanks’s recent criticisms against the
Fregean conception in general.
3.2. Frege’s own conception and Hanks’s criticisms of
the Fregean conception
The Fregean conception in general considers propositions, i.e.,
thoughts in Frege, as primary bearers of truth-conditions.29
Hanks claims that, under the Fregean conception, judgments
come to have truth-conditions only because they are related to
29Fregean propositions are force-free contents. According to the Fregean
conception, content is sharply distinguished from force. Hanks denies the
content-force distinction. Hanks’s propositions include force as their parts.
See Hanks (2007), Hanks (2011), ch.4 of Hanks (2015).
thoughts in a certain way. Therefore, Hanks (2015, 42) argues,
the Fregean conception ought to answer the question of propo-
sitional unity, i.e., the question as to how an abstract entity like
a thought can have a truth-condition independently of any hu-
man activity.30 Hanks’s point is that the question of proposi-
tional unity is perhaps too difficult (Hanks 2007, §2; Hanks 2015,
ch.2; Hanks 2018, §3); it has never been answered satisfactorily.
According to him, it is a fundamental mistake to explain the
truth-condition of a judgment by appealing to that of a thought;
it is to put the cart before the horse. Hanks maintains that we
ought to explain the truth-condition of a thought by that of a
judgment. The act of judging is representing the world in a par-
ticular way, and so it has a correctness condition. Its correctness
is its truth. Therefore, judgments are primary and independent
bearers of truth-conditions (2015, 66). Thoughts inherit their
truth-conditions from the truth-conditions of judgments.31
It is controversial whether Hanks’s criticisms against at-
tempted explanations of propositional unity are fair and satisfac-
tory. But the issue I would like to address is something different:
why can’t Fregeans accept that a judgment has its truth-condition
by its own nature, i.e., independently of thoughts? For Fregeans,
to judge that ? is to acknowledge the truth of 〈?〉. Say to acknowl-
edge the truth of 〈?〉 is to take 〈?〉 to be true. Then, judging that
? is correct iff 〈?〉 is true. It seems as though Fregeans can insist
that, whether or not 〈?〉 is actually a truth-bearer, judging that
? has a correctness condition equivalent to the truth-condition
of 〈?〉 solely because it is acknowledging the truth of 〈?〉. Even
30Frege’s answer to the question of propositional unity appeals to the
metaphorical notion of saturation. See, e.g., Frege (1891, 1892c,b, 1906a).
Hanks (2015, §2.1) criticizes it by saying that Frege’s answer leaves proposi-
tional unity primitive and impenetrable and it does not help us to understand
how we represent the world in our mental acts.
31According to Hanks, (assertoric) propositions are not contents but act-
types, namely, types of judgments as mental acts. See Hanks (2011) and ch.3
of Hanks (2015).
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if thoughts turn out not to be bearers of truth-conditions, that
only means that 〈?〉 cannot be true because it cannot be a truth-
candidate, and so judging that ? is incorrect. This shows that
even if Fregeans fail to explain propositional unity, they can still
explain why judgments have correctness conditions equivalent
to truth-conditions.
One might wonder why Fregeans would retain the notion of
thought if thoughts do not play the role of providing truth-
conditions for judgments. In reply, there is still an important
role to be played by thoughts, specifically, the role of securing the
objectivity of judgment. A thought is objective so that its truth-
condition and truth-value are determined independently of us.
Hence, if the correctness condition of a judgment consists in a
thought being true, the correctness of a judgment is determined
objectively.
According to Hanks, however, Fregeans cannot make the sug-
gested move. He writes:
Judgment, on the Fregean view, is an act of endorsing [or acknowl-
edging] a proposition. . . We cannot say that to endorse a propo-
sition is to accept is as true. To accept a proposition ? as true is
either to judge that ? is true or it is a neutral, non-committal act
of attributing truth to ?. If accepting ? as true is to judge that ? is
true then we’ve analyzed one judgment, judging that ?, in terms
of another, judging that ? is true. This leads to a regress. . . So, the
act of endorsing a proposition cannot be analyzed as accepting a
proposition as true. . . It looks as though the Fregean is going to
have to view judgment as a primitive attitude one can bear to a
proposition (Hanks 2015, 45).
The second horn of the dilemma obviously cannot work as an
analysis of judgment. The major reason why Hanks believes
that the Fregeans ought to leave judgment qua acknowledgment
primitive consists in the vicious infinite regress Frege is appeal-
ing to in the indefinability argument. According to Hanks (2015,
16), this is why Frege seems to leave judgment a ‘peculiar and
incomparable’, i.e., primitive, notion. If Fregeans have to leave
judgment primitive and thus cannot explain the relationship
between judgment and truth by appealing to the nature of judg-
ment, the only way Fregeans can explain the correctness condi-
tion of judgment is to appeal to thoughts qua bearers of truth-
conditions. Or so argues Hanks.
But Hanks is not entirely correct in saying that Frege leaves
judgment a primitive notion. As we have seen, Frege attempts to
elucidate judgment as identification of the True where the latter
is to be understood as a non-judgmental/non-predicational act
of identification. The vicious infinite regress is produced if truth
is a property of thoughts and thus judging qua acknowledging
the truth of a thought comes down to predicating the prop-
erty truth of a thought. Hanks’s own vicious regress argument
implicitly presupposes that truth is a property and thus that
judging qua acknowledging truth is predicating truth. However,
for Frege, truth is not a property of thoughts and judging is not
predicating truth. He can avoid the infinite regress.
One might object that what it takes to stop the vicious regress
is in the end to make judgment a primitive and unanalyzable ac-
tion, because even in my reading judgment qua non-judgmental
identification is primitive and unanalyzable. If Frege were also
to end up making the notion of judgment merely primitive un-
der my interpretation, then Hanks’s objection would still stand.
Nevertheless, this objection is misleading. The primitiveness of
a notion is decided by its place in the explanatory hierarchy. In
Frege’s framework, judgment is elucidated by non-judgmental
identification. Thus, judgment is not entirely primitive. If my
discussion is along the lines, the fact that Frege takes judgment
to be primitive ought to be read in a different way. Frege fails
to come up with a proper way to analyze the notion of non-
judgmental identification. Therefore, he should have to leave
his elucidation of judgment incomplete, saying that judgment is
primitive. That does not mean that, as the objection argues, what
it takes to stop the vicious infinite regress is to make judgment
primitive. Even if Frege had been equipped with the Millikanian
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analysis of non-judgmental identification and applied it to the
analysis of judgment, the vicious infinite regress would not have
returned.
Frege would be able to elucidate why judgments can have
truth-conditions by appealing to (FJ): to judge that ? is to iden-
tify ? with the True non-judgmentally. It is correct to identify ?
with the True non-judgmentally just in case ? is the True. Hence,
judging that ? is correct just in case ? is the True. Now, ? is the
True iff ?. Thus, judging that ? is correct iff ?. This inference
shows that judging that ? has its correctness condition where
correctness is just truth not because it derives its correctness con-
dition from the truth-condition of a thought but because it is an
act of identification. In this case, the independence of judgments’
truth-conditions from thoughts’ truth-conditions is clearer. The
correctness condition of identification obtains whether or not
thoughts have truth-conditions. Of course, Frege does look upon
thoughts as legitimate bearers of truth and truth-conditions—
not because they have the property truth but because sentences
refer to the True by virtue of their thoughts. Therefore, he still
needs to answer the question of propositional unity in one way
or another. Nevertheless, Frege does not need to be committed
to the claim that the truth-condition of judgment is derived from
that of thoughts.
One might still object that the above elucidation of the
truth-condition of a judgment implicitly depends on the truth-
condition of a thought. There are two ways of developing this
objection. One is to argue that 〈? is the True〉 is identical with
〈〈?〉 is true〉. However, Frege would never accept this claim. 〈〈?〉
is true〉 is identical with 〈?〉. However, 〈? is the True〉 cannot be
identical with 〈?〉 just as the sense of ‘2’ cannot be identical with
〈2 = 1 + 1〉. Therefore, 〈〈?〉 is true〉 is not identical with 〈? is
the True〉. The other way to develop this objection is to say that
? is the True because 〈?〉 is true. However, Frege would not ac-
cept this claim, either. He does not recognize the existence of the
property truth at all.
There is Hanks’s other main complaint against the Fregean
conception that can be answered by Frege. The Fregean concep-
tion requires there to be an act of grasping—or entertaining—
the thought whose truth we are about to acknowledge. To grasp
a thought is to identify and single out a thought among many
others. As such, grasping a thought is not making a commitment
to the truth of the thought. It is a neutral, non-committal, mental
act that is commonly found not just in the act of judging but also
in the act of asking, hypothesizing, etc. About the act of grasping
a thought, Hanks writes:
. . . Prior to judging that ?, we do things like ask whether ?, or hy-
pothesize that ?, . . . These are the kinds of actions that Frege points
to when he wants to illustrate entertainment. The error comes in
making these actions preconditions for judgments. In some cases
acts of judgment are preceded by entertainment-like preliminar-
ies, but they do not have to be. Entertainment has some intuitive
appeal, but only because sometimes we do things that look like
Fregean entertainment (Hanks 2015, 35–36).
His criticism is that though sometimes an entertainment-like
stage precedes a judgment, it is a mistake to suppose that every
judgment is preceded by such a stage. In Hanks’s conception of
judgment, there is no stage that corresponds to entertainment
in the Fregean conception; there is no thought to be entertained
in his framework. We rather assert that, say, Frege is a German
by directly predicating the property being a German of the object
Frege. When we are (sometimes) in an entertainment-like stage,
we are in a cancellation context where assertoric force is canceled,
i.e., our predication is canceled.
The point of this criticism is not that if the Fregean concep-
tion is correct, then we should be able to empirically identify the
exact moment of grasping a thought before making a judgment
in all the actual occurrences of judging, which we often cannot.
The requirement of the empirical identifiability of the prece-
dence of entertainment in each and every episode of judgment
seems unfairly strong. For, as Hanks concedes, the Fregean’s
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two-stage decomposition of judgment into grasping a thought
and acknowledging its truth is based on ‘abstractions from the
overall act of forming a judgment. . . which we can distinguish as
theorists’ (2018, §2; italics mine). Shortly, the Fregean conception
only assumes that there must be in principle the moment of enter-
tainment that precedes the act of judgment. Hanks’s objection
is that such an assumption—leaving aside the empirical identi-
fiability of the moment of entertainment—is unnecessary if the
assumption is only for explaining entertainment-like moments.
Given Hanks’s alternative, the existence of entertainment-like
moments alone does not make us committed to the theoretical
assumption that such a moment always precedes a judgment.
However, I think that we can say something stronger than that
against the assumption. Specifically, there seems to be a reason
to take such an assumption to be false. To explain this reason, let
me first point out that Frege does seem to say that entertaining
〈?〉 is a precondition for judging that ? in that sense:
Whenever anyone recognizes something to be true, he makes a
judgment. What he recognizes to be true is a thought. It is im-
possible to recognize a thought as true before it has been grasped
(Frege 1915, 251).
Frege makes this point, I believe, because he is considering the
notion of judgment in the scientific context where grasping a
thought—coming up with a hypothesis—and acknowledging
the truth of the thought—justifying the hypothesis—often come
separately. In ‘Sources of knowledge of Mathematics and the
Mathematical Natural Sciences’ (1924, 267) he considers ‘judg-
ment proper’ to be knowledge. This shows that Frege is consid-
ering the act of judging in the context where it is combined with
the act of justifying scientifically. If judging is an act loaded with
an act of justifying scientifically, it appears plausible to say that
grasping a thought is a precondition for judging as such.
However, if we consider judging qua acknowledging the truth
of a thought to be independent of that of justifying, then grasp-
ing a thought does not appear to be a precondition for judging in
all cases. Suppose that I know Olga Tokarczuk’s The Last Stories.
I see my friend who studies Polish literature having a conver-
sation with her colleague. My friend utters ‘Olga Tokarczuk’s
Ostatnie historie explores death’. I gently intervene and ask ‘Just
like The Last Stories?’ My friend says ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories’. Since I trust her knowledge in Polish literature, I accept
her assertion. My acceptance of my friend’s assertion that Ostat-
nie historie is The Last Stories is my judgment that Ostatnie historie
is The Last Stories. Notice that I cannot grasp 〈Ostatnie historie is
The Last Stories〉 before my acceptance of the assertion. Before my
acceptance, I do not even realize that ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories’ contains such a thought because I do not know that ‘Os-
tatnie historie’ has a sense. One might argue that because 〈Ostatnie
historie〉 is identical with 〈The Last Stories〉, I grasp 〈Ostatnie histo-
rie〉 in the sense that I grasp 〈The Last Stories〉. But the fact that I
grasp 〈The Last Stories〉 appears to be irrelevant because I do not
know that 〈Ostatnie historie〉 is identical with 〈The Last Stories〉.
In this case, my act of judging that Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories comes earlier than my grasping the relevant thought.
The question is then whether Frege’s conception of judgment
can provide a proper explanation for this kind of situation where
judging comes earlier than grasping a thought. I believe that it
can. My acceptance of my friend’s assertion, i.e., my judgment
that Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories is non-judgmental identifi-
cation of the True with the reference of ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories’. I can perform this non-judgmental identification with-
out already grasping 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories〉 because
all I achieve by it is to assign a referent to ‘Ostatnie historie is The
Last Stories’.32 What I achieve can be compared to baptizing an
32This point is related to a main thesis of neo-logicism in philosophy of
mathematics. Neo-logicism that inherits its main ideas from Frege holds the
‘syntactic priority’ thesis: the claim that ‘if we speak truly, the structure of
reality inevitably mirrors the contours of our speech’ (MacBride 2003, 108). If
we accept it, the fact that we take a certain syntactic structure with a singular
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object with a name, which does not require one to antecedently
grasp the sense of the name. Now, if I am further committed
to the claim that an expression has its referent by virtue of its
sense, I come to be committed to the existence of the sense of
‘Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories’, 〈Ostatnie historie is The Last
Stories〉, by my non-judgmental identification. This commitment
makes me grasp the thought qua the sense of ‘Ostatnie historie
is The Last Stories’. Therefore, my grasping the thought is not a
precondition for my making the relevant judgment. This estab-
lishes that Frege’s conception of judgment does not have to be
committed to the strong claim that grasping a thought is always
a precondition for making a judgment—though Frege himself
is committed to it because he only focuses on scientific contexts
where we attempt to make judgments only with strict and precise
justifications given.
One might object that since multiple different senses belong
to a single reference, one cannot backtrack the sense of an ex-
pression from its reference as I suggest in the above explanation.
However, this objection overlooks the fact that I am backtracking
the relevant thought not from the True alone, but from the True
and the expression ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories’. I can def-
initely single out the relevant thought qua the reference of ‘the
sense of “Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories” ’ if I acknowledge
the reference of ‘Ostatnie historie is The Last Stories’.
One might wonder why we need to identify the act of grasping
a thought as a part of judging if judging is such an act of identi-
fication that does not antecedently require the act of grasping a
thought. Hanks (2015, 34–35) claims that the notion of grasping
a thought is just a fancy that results from accepting thoughts
term ‘B’ to be true provides a sufficient reason to think that there is an item in
the world that can be identified as B. What I am arguing here is that Frege can
say the same thing about sense: the fact that we take ‘0 = 1’ (where 1’ is not
a name known to use antecedently) to be true provides a sufficient reason to
think that ‘1’ has a sense. If so, we can backtrack the sense of ‘1’ after we take
the identity sentence to be true.
as abstract entities and the only sources of truth-conditions. But
I disagree. The gap between a name’s sense and its reference
pointed out in the last section has epistemic reality. We know
something about the name ‘Odysseus’, e.g., that it would be a
name of a person if there were Odysseus. We can also use the
name as such in a number of different sentences. Nevertheless,
whatever we know about it does not let us decide whether the
name has a reference or whether Odysseus is identical with the
reference of a name whose sense and reference are known to us.
If we call whatever it is that we understand about ‘Odysseus’
its sense, we are in a position where we grasp 〈Odysseus〉 but
fail to accomplish reference-level knowledge such as knowledge
of existence or identity. In this way, Frege’s notion of grasping
a name’s sense is grounded in the epistemic reality concerning
our knowledge of names. Now, exactly the same elucidation of
grasping can be applied to the act of grasping a thought if we
accept that sentences are names. The act of asking, hypothesiz-
ing, etc., can be taken to show that there can be a gap between a
thought and its truth-value just like the gap between 〈Odysseus〉
and Odysseus.33
One can ask whether we have reasons to accept that sentences
are names. For theorists like Frege who hold onto the Fregean
conception of judgment, the indefinability argument provides a
sufficient reason. It establishes that if we hold onto the Fregean
conception of judgment, we ought to deny that truth is a property
of truth-bearers. To take truth to be an object sentences refer to
seems to be arguably the only alternative for the Fregean.
Here I can’t fully address whether there are other reasons to
take sentences as names. But I first indicate the discussions of
commentators like Burge (1986) and Ricketts (2007) that show the
benefits of taking sentences as names. Secondly, Frege’s own con-
ception of judgment has theoretical benefits that deserve thor-
ough examination. In addition to the point that it provides ar-
33If so, those acts are not presented as preliminary stages for judgments.
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guably defensible responses to Hanks’s criticisms, it brings our
attention to a largely neglected subject: non-judgmental identi-
fication of an object. It also points to the possibility of a unified
explanation of our cognitive activity by showing a way to reduce
propositional activity like judgment to objectual recognition.
4. Concluding Remarks
I mentioned the skepticism against revisiting the indefinabil-
ity argument. But our literal reading of the argument pays off.
It shows that the indefinability argument is tightly bound to
Frege’s conception of judgment qua acknowledgment of truth.
He maintains that truth is an object—the True—because he re-
alizes that he cannot hold both his conception of judgment and
the common belief that truth is a property. The indefinability
argument is an expression of this insight. Now, Frege has to
come up with a way to cash out the notion of truth acknowledg-
ment that goes along with this insight. His elucidation of it in
‘On Sense and Reference’ and other works according to which
truth acknowledgment is non-judgmental identification of the
True is his reaction to this request. Frege’s unique conception of
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